The passport data page is the page that carries the holder’s personal details, portrait and machine readable zone. Its layout is fixed by ICAO Doc 9303, so every passport follows the same structure regardless of the issuing state. For an inspector, that structure is a map: it tells you where each element should be, and therefore where a deviation means something.
This article walks through the data page zone by zone, explains how personalisation differs between paper and polycarbonate pages, and sets out a data page check you can do with a magnifier and a UV light.
The layout defined by ICAO 9303
ICAO Doc 9303 describes the passport data page as two parts: the visual inspection zone (VIZ) at the top and the machine readable zone (MRZ) at the bottom. The standard specifies the size of the page and the order and position of the data fields, so that officers and machines can read any compliant passport.
Within the visual inspection zone, the specification groups the content into numbered zones:
- Zone I, the header. Issuing state and document type.
- Zone II, personal data. Name and other mandatory and optional personal data elements.
- Zone III, document data. Document number, dates of issue and expiry, and the issuing authority.
- Zone IV, signature. The holder’s signature or usual mark, where the issuing state places it on the data page.
- Zone V, identification feature. The portrait.
- Zone VI, optional data. Data elements the issuing state chooses to add.
- Zone VII, the MRZ. Two lines of 44 characters on a passport.
The standard governs the frame. The security features printed into and around that frame are chosen by each issuing state, which is why reference material such as PRADO, the public register of identity and travel documents maintained by the Council of the European Union, remains essential. For more on the standard itself, see ICAO 9303 explained.
The portrait and secondary image
The portrait in zone V is the single most important element for linking the document to the holder. It is also a common target, because replacing a photograph is easier than producing a complete counterfeit.
On modern data pages, the portrait is integrated into the page rather than attached to it. It is printed or engraved during personalisation, and it is usually overlapped by other features: a fine background print, an optically variable element or a laminate pattern that runs across the edge of the image. Those overlaps are deliberate. A substituted portrait has to reproduce them exactly where they cross the image, and that is where imitations tend to fail.
Many issuing states add a secondary image: a smaller, often ghosted version of the portrait elsewhere on the page. It may be printed in a lighter tone, engraved, perforated or visible only under UV. Check that the two images show the same person, at the same age and with the same features, and that the secondary image is produced by the expected method for that document.
Personalisation: laser engraving versus printing
How the holder’s data was put on the page determines what a genuine page looks like under magnification.
Polycarbonate data pages are personalised by laser engraving. The laser darkens the material inside the layers, so the data sits within the page rather than on its surface. Under 10x to 15x magnification, laser engraved text shows fine, consistent strokes made of small carbonised spots, without ink spreading or toner particles. Some engraving can be felt as a slight relief.
Paper data pages are typically personalised by printing, often inkjet or a comparable process, and then protected by a laminate or a thin security film. Under magnification, the printed data shows the dot structure of the process used, and the laminate carries its own features, such as a diffractive pattern or retroreflective images.
The practical point is consistency. Every personal data element on the page should have been applied by the same process at the same time. Text that looks printed on a page that should be engraved, or a portrait made by a different process from the name below it, is a reason to look further.
Where tampering usually shows on a passport data page
Alterations concentrate in a few places, because those are the elements a fraudster needs to change.
Portrait area. Look for breaks in the background print where it meets the photo, edges that sit above the surface, adhesive residue, and laminate that lifts or shows bubbles near the image.
Name and date fields. Look for characters with a different weight, spacing or alignment than the rest, and for disturbance in the background print behind them. Erasure tends to damage fine background lines.
The MRZ. The MRZ repeats the key data with check digits. If a printed date has been changed but the MRZ has not, the two no longer agree. If the MRZ has been reprinted, its typeface, spacing or position may deviate. See the machine readable zone check for how to work through the check digits.
Laminate and edges. On paper data pages, a lifted or replaced laminate is a classic route to the data underneath. Check the edges and the hinge area for cuts, glue and unevenness.
A data page check with a magnifier and a UV light
A structured check takes a couple of minutes and covers most of what a first-line officer can verify by hand. For checks away from a desk, see mobile passport inspection.
- White light, no magnification. Overall layout against the expected model for that document. Zones in the right place, typeface consistent, nothing visibly added.
- Tilt. Tilt the page under a light source to check optically variable features and the laminate. Our article on viewing angle security features explains what to look for.
- Magnification at 10x to 15x. Personal data, portrait edges and the background print where it crosses the photo. Confirm the personalisation method.
- UV at 365nm. The page substrate should behave as expected for that document: most security paper and polycarbonate pages are UV dull, with fluorescent features printed in defined places. Look for fluorescent patches, smears or fibres where they should not be. For the method, see how to check passport authenticity with UV light.
- MRZ against VIZ. Compare the data and calculate at least the document number and date check digits.
- Compare with reference. Check the security features against a reference for that document type and issue. The wider set of passport features is covered in authentication of security features in passports.
Frequently asked questions
What is the passport data page?
It is the page that holds the holder’s personal data, the portrait and the machine readable zone. In most passports it is the second or third page of the booklet, and in many recent passports it is a polycarbonate page bound into the booklet.
Is the layout of the data page the same in every passport?
The structure is the same, because it follows ICAO Doc 9303. The security features, colours and background designs differ per issuing state and per issue.
What magnification do I need for a data page check?
A 10x to 15x magnifier resolves microprint, the dot structure of printing and the edges of laser engraving. Higher magnification is useful in a second-line examination.
Can the MRZ prove a passport is genuine?
No. Correct check digits show that the data is internally consistent. A well made counterfeit can have correct check digits. It is a fast filter, not a conclusion.
Why does the data page look different under UV?
Security paper and polycarbonate pages are generally UV dull, and issuing states add fluorescent inks and fibres in defined places. Under UV, those features become visible and anything that should not fluoresce stands out.
Equipment for data page checks
A data page check needs magnification, a UV light at 365nm and a white light you can use at an angle. The manual inspection magnifiers in our range combine 10x to 15x magnification with UV and oblique light in one handheld unit, such as the 10x Magnifier Immigration Basic. Products are available via request a quote.
Written by the Dexeq editorial team. Dexeq was founded in 2011 by a former officer of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee with 18 years of service, 11 of them as a document fraud expert.
Sources: ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents (International Civil Aviation Organization); PRADO, Public Register of Authentic travel and identity Documents Online (Council of the European Union).
